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Abstract 
Waste picking has become a prominent activity in the urban landscape, 
bridging the gap between shortfalls in service delivery and personal income 
generation in virtually all cities of the developing world. Overcoming previous 
stigmatization and work fragmentation through organization and dialogue,  
social economy organizations constituted by waste pickers  are emerging as 
valuable actors in the governance framework, partnering at times with the 
public and private sectors to fulfil public service provision while aiming to 
improve the livelihoods of the poor and overcome the institutional nature of 
poverty. Bogota’s Plan Maestro Integral de Residuos Solidos (PMIRS) serves as 
a case study to explore these new modalities in service delivery, and to delve 
into the theoretical dimensions and practical implications of fomenting the 
inclusion of informal waste pickers into integrated solid waste management 
systems. 
Keywords 
Waste picking, poverty, social economy, governance, Bogotá (Colombia). 
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1 Introduction 
Social economy organisations are sometimes affected by lack of resources, 
capacities, formalisation, legal protection and general public recognition. One 
of the ways in which they seek to solve these problems is by establishing 
partnerships with local governments. At the same time, local governments tend 
to see social economy organisations as actors with a high legitimacy basis that 
can aid them in fulfilling their public service delivery responsibilities. In the 
context of budgetary restrictions, such partnerships are often tied up to income 
generation schemes for disadvantaged groups. They thus seem low-cost 
solutions to achieve various goals in one go: service delivery, social inclusion, 
and poverty alleviation. However, these partnerships are not unproblematic 
and create a series of challenges for both local government and social economy 
organisations (Billis, 2010).  
This paper will look at the partnership between waste pickers, their 
cooperatives and the government of the city of Bogotá, Colombia. In 2004 the 
Plan Maestro de Manejo Integral de Residuos Solidos (PMIRS) was established 
through the active engagements of public sector entities and Bogotá’s Waste 
Picker Association (ARB). It was a new projection of solid waste management 
launched with the recicladores, as waste pickers are locally known, to provide 
solid waste management services, address environmental degradation, 
exclusion and poverty reduction within a mutually beneficial scheme. 
Characteristic of informal sectors enterprises, waste picking is hard to quantify, 
yet in the city of Bogotá, the National Statistics Department (DANE) 
identified 3,692 households amounting to a total of 8,479 individuals actively 
taking part in waste picking activities. 
This research aims to analyze the partnership between a social economy 
organisation and a local government that declared social inclusion, poverty 
alleviation and empowerment to be central goals. To what extent has the 
alliance between the city of Bogotá and waste picker cooperatives changed the 
situation of poverty and exclusion of the waste pickers? To what extent were 
the service delivery goals achieved? What factors explain the outcomes of the 
partnership? The focus of the research is the partnership itself and its impact 
on the actors, some of them created specifically within the PMIRS.  
The case of the PMIRS was chosen for this study for various reasons. 
Waste picking is an income generating activity that knows no boundaries, 
actively engaging the poorest of the poor throughout the world to comb 
through streams of waste during the process of transportation, disposal or at 
the final dumping sites. A growing trend amongst waste pickers in Latin 
America has been their organization into groups within the social economy. 
They thus reduce fragmentation by organizing activities and demands for their 
members, and serve as immediate platforms to communicate with external 
actors. Local governments are mainly responsible for integrated solid waste 
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management systems and can hardly overlook the fact that their obligations are 
being fulfilled by informal workers who have initiated processes of waste 
reduction through reuse and recycling. Bogotá hence tried out an innovative 
scheme to address the problem, designing a new modality of service delivery 
that centred on the formal participation of the waste pickers’ associations.  
The study started with a thorough literature search, including the specific 
laws and decrees at the base of the PMIRS and the studies performed by the 
DANE regarding the waste picking population of Bogotá. This was followed 
by a revision of government documents, local and national newspapers, 
documentaries and conference proceedings. A series of interviews was 
conducted with the representatives of the waste pickers’ organisations, the 
director for the ARB and the NGO WASTE. Most of the data used in this 
study comes from secondary sources, mainly because of the lack of resources 
to collect primary data and the inability to secure the personal safety of the 
researchers.  
2   The evolving paradigm of  state involvement 
The state holds both rights and obligations through a social contract, in the 
same way as individuals do towards the state and society at large, and these are 
bounded to the frameworks operating in every country. Within a historical 
perspective, part of the state’s obligation has been to design, implement and 
regulate social and economic policies, with special obligations to organize 
public service provision. The ascendency of the neo-liberal project has placed 
new priorities regarding the state’s involvement in both social and economic 
affairs, diminishing its presence based on the perspective that ‘too much state’ 
creates distortions and higher transactional costs in the economy. In the face of 
globalization, the “greater mobility of the factors of production,” also reveals a 
weakened capacity of governments in affecting domestic policies (Paquet 2001: 
183). 
As structural adjustment programs have demonstrated throughout 
developing countries, cutbacks on social investment create an entirely new set 
of challenges which have impacted countries in different ways, from the 
disintegration of educational programs, the inexistence of health services, the 
cutbacks in service delivery and increased resource scarcity to name a few. 
Cutback of state action, however, has been compounded by the rise of other 
actors who have taken up these responsibilities, and an overall reorganization 
of relationships between the public sector, private sector and civil society has 
ensued, giving rise to what is termed a ‘governance’ framework. Governance 
has emerged out of the general recognition that the state still holds a primary 
position in both economic and social policy making, principally as an enabler 
which brings together formal and informal networks to reorient the 
configuration of the market. This moves actors away from traditional roles and 
responsibilities towards more complementary relationships. 
In order to understand how governance has reshaped relationships not 
only at a macro-level but on a municipal scale, it is important first to underline 
two particular trends that have directly impacted the internal separation of 
responsibilities. Initially decentralization has relegated certain areas of policy 
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making from central to local governments. The principal of subsidiarity states 
that “power should devolve on the lowest, most local level at which decisions 
can reasonably be made, with the functions of the larger unit being to support 
and assist the local body in carrying out its tasks” (Bellah et al. 1991 in: Paquet 
2001: 195). Paquet further argues that “while subsidiarity reduces the vertical 
hierarchical power, it increases in a meaningful way the potential for 
participation” in other words “distributed governance does not simply mean a 
process of dispersion of power toward localized decision making within each 
sector: it entails a dispersion of power over a wide variety of actors and 
groups” (Nohria and Eccles 1992 in: Paquet 2001: 188).  
Moving away from direct service provision, the role of government shifted 
towards the creation of an enabling environment where external actors 
contribute according to their skills and specialization. In other words, 
government is moving away from a bureaucratic structure that has the 
“concern to do” towards a leaner, efficient administrative body that has “the 
concern to get things done” (Batley and Larbi 2004: 15). Even where there is 
the need for intervention, “government does not necessarily have to assume 
the entire responsibility for the provision of a service. The case for 
governments assuming responsibility may be reduced by separating the 
elements of service provision” (Batley and Larbi 2004: 32). 
By applying subsidiarity to service delivery, many local governments are 
decentralizing their management by creating autonomous agencies who serve 
as executive managers in service delivery, contracting out portions or the 
totality of the service to external actors (Batley and Larbi 2004: 45). This 
overall vision is deeply driven by New Public Management (NPM) whose 
practices are rooted in taking a management approach to public functions. 
Central to the NPM methods, the professionalization of public servants is 
meant to create leaner, efficient, competitive and technical management of 
services. In the case where in-house knowledge or service delivery comes 
short, the idea of outsourcing and privatizing elements of the service to 
specialized third parties is a central way of cutting back on large bureaucracies.  
The experience with the privatization of public services such as water and 
education in developing countries has been highly contested (Awortwi, 2004). 
It is claimed that privatization often increases costs which reduces availability 
for the poorest of the poor, in such a way that it creates a segmented market 
rather than broadening access for universal coverage as appropriate when these 
services are considered a public good. If public delivery creates burdened 
bureaucracies, and privatization segments the market creating exclusion, one 
wonders how other actors can contribute to service delivery. Intrinsically there 
is no reason for services to either be entirely publicly or privately delivered. As 
more plural systems allow for new groups to contribute to the delivery of these 
services, new considerations arise regarding not only the way in which services 
are divided and delivered, but who will be responsible for providing these 
services. 
From the point of view of local governments, strategic partnerships are 
‘win-win’ relationships based on the mutual gain partners may reap in their area 
of strategic interest (Waddell, 2000). According to Awortwi (2004), there is a 
fundamental difference between partnerships and privatisation in public 
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service delivery: while privatisation means the public sector transfers all 
responsibilities and powers to the private sector, partnership refers to the 
sharing of power and responsibilities. Partnerships with social economy 
organisations are favoured by some local governments, as is the case in the city 
of Bogotá, because of their potential to improve social justice and participation 
in the public realm. Filion argues that “if social justice and a more thorough 
form of democracy is not to be achieved through government reorganization, 
intervention, and redistribution, one alternative is to rely on self-sustaining 
economic activities that promote these same objectives” (Filion 1998: 1109).  
Brandsen and Pestoff argue that the third sector is becoming a key player 
in the organization and delivery of public services. Specifically, “the 
relationship between the third sector and the production process is a dynamic 
one” when accounting for the plethora of citizen groups involved in the actual 
delivery of traditionally state-led services. A growing focus on cooperation and 
emerging forms of public community partnerships encourages new 
arrangements ranging from co-production, co-management and co-governance 
which accounts for the participation of the third sector in the planning and 
delivery of public services (Brandsen and Pestoff 2006: 496-497). To further 
confirm in an institutional sense the growing importance of service delivery 
partnerships, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has recently 
published a set of documents to offer suggestions and best practices on the 
issue of pro-poor municipal partnerships. 
This brings us to view government functions through the eyes of 
redistributive governance which takes into consideration contributions or 
cooperation on behalf of private and civil society actors for enhanced quality 
and coverage of service delivery all the while improving the linkages that may 
reduce inequalities. While in theory partnerships may seem beneficial for all 
parties, in practice it is very hard to strike a balance between interests, 
efficiency, coverage and the inclusion of marginal workers and their 
organizations. Oftentimes, outsourcing contracts are granted to large private 
sector firms with the ability to invest in technology and capital intensive 
processes rather than groups of organized marginal workers. In other instances 
a mix of private and cooperative actors encourages a ‘fragmented coherence’ in 
the overall delivery of service. This is to say that “the state, private sector and 
communities may all share responsibility for provision, with each 
compensating for the delivery shortfalls of the other, but with no clear 
mechanisms of accountability or coordination structures in place” (Beall and 
Fox 2009: 155). 
For local leaders, “the metropolitan challenge is one of establishing 
institutional structures and processes that effectively mediate diverse interests 
to ensure comprehensive action at the metropolitan scale” (Beall and Fox 
2009: 215). Integrated systems for service delivery would compel a new kind of 
approach which reduces redundancy, vertical and horizontal conflict between 
actors and provides opportunities to marginal groups. The distributional 
benefits of including marginal groups in service delivery would allow 
municipalities to effectively reconsider the structures of access of the poor to 
services and income generation opportunities, and generate spill-over effects 
out these new linkages.  
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Naturally, there is a challenge for the poor to organize and operate in such 
a way as their activities are compatible with the new service delivery design and 
requirements. Social economy organisations that are constitutive of the poor 
surface as a potential solution to the management and delivery of services 
while offering new channels of economic and social participation for the poor 
as the existence of such organisations is meant to reduce fragmentation by 
moving from an individual to a collective stance thus strengthening associative 
bonds and representation while in turn allowing for the collaboration between 
local governments and these organizations. In broad terms “a social enterprise 
is a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally 
reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than 
being driven by the need to maximize profit for shareholders and owners.” 
(Hewitt 2002: 2).  
Participation alone, however, does not guarantee that benefits will be 
extensive enough to overturn poverty as a structural problem. It is necessary to 
underline that participation must lead to alteration within the structures of 
access, which the social economy literature proposes as “reinstating social 
justice in production relations” (Moulaert and Ailenei 2005). From an analytical 
standpoint, social justice has evolved to represent two principle claims; one of 
recognition and one of redistribution which form the analytical backbone of 
the ensuing analysis. As argued by Fraser, recognition “targets injustices it 
understands as cultural which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of 
representation…” (Fraser 1999: 27). The author argues that at the root, non-
recognition, disrespect and cultural domination devaluate identities that make it 
particularly difficult to overcome dominant patterns and paradigms (ibid). In 
this way, empowerment evolves as a vehicle to reinstate voice and plead for 
recognition in the public sphere, tackling the overarching social structures that 
have led to non-recognition and marginality in the first place.  
Social justice also encompasses the need for redistribution which Fraser 
describes as focusing “on injustices it defines as socio-economic and presumes 
to be rooted in the political economy” (Fraser 1999: 27). Redistribution can 
mean an immediate repartition of goods, assets or income, but in broader 
terms refers to restructuring the economic access that creates deprivation in 
the first place (ibid). Providing access to these resources is key to advance the 
faculty of groups to cultivate their realm of influence and their ability to grow. 
In this way, accessing more resources reflect a change in socioeconomic 
patterns.  
The social economy profoundly holds a distinct paradigm as it is driven by 
the formation of associative bonds. Hirst argues that as a social theory, 
associativism postulates the defence of a market economy based in the non-
capitalist principles of cooperation and mutuality (Hirst 1994 in: Rodriguez 
Garavito 2004: 7). Association is therefore a way of countering 
individualization which “fosters social fragmentation, emphasizes the fault 
lines between different social groups and thus limits possibilities for 
integration” (Gerometta et al. 2005: 2008). Focusing on association, rather than 
individualization, helps counter the posture of mainstream economics, which 
make it “difficult to recognize how economic action is constrained and shaped 
by the structures of social relations in which all real economic actors are 
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embedded” (Granovetter 1992: 4). In practical terms, the collective stance 
provided by the social economy helps previously fragmented workers represent 
themselves as an entity in negotiations and bargaining, whether this be in 
contract bidding, the subsequent terms of engagement or conditions and 
benefits of their work. Further, it helps these entities represent themselves and 
liaise with external actors from universities and non-governmental 
organizations to obtain external information and knowledge, further aiding in 
the structuring of the organization, the training of its members to upgrade 
skills and processes, further providing recognition from society at large. 
Cooperatives are an interesting case study as they have often been claimed 
to straddle between the logics of private firms and civil organization groups, 
inherently creating value-added production, yet redistributing earnings between 
members of the enterprise or community (See Figure 2.1). Being one of the 
main actors of the social economy, it has given way to the organization and 
participation of the poor in numerous fields of activity from agriculture to 
waste-picking. Yet as any organization of individuals, participation is selective. 
In the case of workers’ cooperatives, the egalitarian redistribution of 
earnings between members puts pressure on these members to reduce the 
inclusion and participation of undesirable or underperforming individuals in 
the group, meaning that while cooperatives commonly represent the poor, they 
represent a selected group within this heterogeneous population (Abarca 2009). 
Yet the reflection goes further to account that “contrary to the ubiquitous 
optimistic assertions about the benefits of public participation, there are 
numerous documented examples of situations where individuals find it easier, 
more beneficial, or habitually familiar not to participate” (Cleaver 1999: 607). 
Abarca further highlights in the context of waste picking that at times 
individual waste pickers prefer to operate on their own because this provides 
greater flexibility in terms of the quantity of hours worked, personal 
scheduling, pace of work or final resale point (Abarca 2009). In other words, it 
is important to keep in mind that widespread representativeness is not a 
systematic outcome of waste-pickers’ cooperatives. 
As a market actor, cooperatives nonetheless propose to enhance 
participation within the economic structure yet they are only one actor 
amongst a multitude operating and competing within the market. Gomez and 
Helmsing remind us that “in order to foster economic and social innovation, 
there is a need for collaboration and complementation of roles among 
organizations of different types because there is more than one solution to 
implement economic policies to attain welfare objectives” (Gomez and 
Helmsing 2009: 9). This brings us to view the importance of analysing the 
evolving configuration of the market, and the position and relations that local 
actors have with regards to each other. 
The question remains whether the representation of collective interests 
and the inclusion of workers’ cooperatives in public service delivery will 
inevitably create social justice in production relations and reduce poverty. The 
case of Bogotá’s integrated solid waste management plan which proposes to 
promote the inclusion of waste picker cooperatives in service delivery will be 
analysed for deeper insight into these theoretical dimensions.  
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FIGURE 2.1 
 The three systems of the economy 
 
(Amin 2009: 26) 
3  Waste picking: a default occupation in Bogotá? 
The armed conflict in Colombia has displaced the population of entire villages 
from rural to urban locations. The flow of migrants outstripped the quantity of 
jobs created by industrial growth, meaning that many individuals were 
relegated to informally produce goods and services to generate an income, 
segmenting the economically active population in a dual economy (De Oliveira 
and Roberts 1994: 53). Born out of these historical trends, and due to a lack of 
functional redistributive social policies until the edification of a new 
constitution in the early 90’s, Colombian cities have fostered the propagation 
of waste picking as one of these precarious forms of informal employment. In 
Bogotá, “the money generated by the collection of activities that compose the 
recycling circuit (...) was 22 million dollars” in 1990 (Rodriguez Garavito 2004: 
15).  
The significance and logic behind these numbers and the occupation of 
waste picking is that it is accessible to all individuals who have the physical 
capacities to filter through waste streams, separate goods and transport them to 
a resale point. In other terms, barriers to entry into waste picking are low, and 
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based more on physical ability than education, skill or capital requirements. 
Waste picking is a labour intensive independent activity which can be taken up 
as a permanent or temporary income generator for virtually any migrant, 
unemployed or underemployed individual, which is why its popularity and 
presence in the urban landscape has survived the cyclical up and downturns of 
the larger economy. 
FIGURE 3.1 
 Waste Value Chain (prior to PMIRS) 
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Waste pickers’ ability to earn a living is largely dependent on the 
generation and disposal of waste by society, and as such it is important to 
broadly define its categories, volume and movement. Indeed, waste 
management is a complex construction of the post-consumption flows 
instigated by households, commerce, organizations and industry and integrated 
into multi-scalar processes of recollection, separation, transportation, 
transformation and disposal (See Figure 3.1). Waste takes on many forms from 
organic to toxic, meaning that each category requires different methods of 
transformation and disposal to ensure limited environmental impact. 
Mainstream household and office waste, more specifically non-organic 
recyclable materials including paper, cardboard, plastics, glass and corrugated 
metals are central to this study, as these are the principal materials that waste 
pickers in Bogotá recuperate and transform for resale. These materials not only 
withhold the most concrete economic value for waste pickers, but constitute a 
significant bulk of the waste that local governments want to deduce from 
overall waste flows in order to extend the lives of sanitary landfills and dumps 
existing in the municipality. 
In 2008, approximately 25,079 tons of waste was generated daily 
throughout Colombia, averaging the disposal rate of .56kg/person/per day at 
the national level (Superintendencia De Servicios Publicos 2008). Specifically 
speaking, Bogotá alone produces 6,500 tons of waste daily, which is disposed 
at the Doña Juana sanitary landfill which not only serves the Bogotá 
community, but further absorbs the residual waste of six neighbouring 
municipalities (Jaramillo Henao and Zapata Marquez 2008: 32). Given a 
significant rural-urban divide in waste management characterized by higher 
trends of consumption and disposal in urban areas, the volume, flows and 
organization of waste management systems differ. In fact “higher volumes of 
garbage are associated with rising levels of affluence, cheaper consumer 
products, built-in obsolescence, increased packaging and the demand for 
convenience products” (Beall and Fox 2009: 144). 
In terms of non-organic waste, Bogotá accounts for approximately a 
quarter of all waste produced in the country despite representing less than 18% 
of the overall population (Superintendencia De Servicios Publicos 2008: 46). 
This means that residents of Bogotá dispose on average more solid goods per 
capita, posing a stress on current systems of municipal management, which, 
according to a 2005 census formally covers only 7 out of 45 million 
Colombians (Superintendencia De Servicios Publicos 2008: 21). The significant 
gap in coverage stimulates the spread and reliance on alternative systems, 
specifically fostering economic opportunities for different groupings of waste 
pickers including itinerant waste buyers, street waste pickers, transit collection 
crew and dumpsite waste pickers who operate at different transit points along 
the waste value chain illustrated in Figure 3.1. This goes to demonstrate the 
centrality not only of waste picker’s purpose and role in complementing or 
altogether fulfilling municipal waste services, but further confirms the need to 
revisit current systems for more integrative strategies. 
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3.1 The profile of waste pickers in Bogotá 
A study performed between 2002 and 2004 by the DANE sought to provide 
concrete data reflective of the size, attributes and organizational nature of the 
recycling circuit and its operators. Specifically, it segments waste pickers first 
by defining their principle activities and later dividing them into functional 
groupings. The waste picker, in Bogotá called el reciclador, is “a person who 
dedicates him/herself to retrieve and recuperate the residues of those materials 
that can submit themselves to a new process of reutilization, through its 
conversion in prime materials useful in the fabrication of new products” 
(Lievano Latorre et al. 2004: 53). In Bogotá, the study stipulates the presence 
of two overall groups, one that is dedicated to waste picking virtually on a full 
time basis, and another that is composed of individuals living on the street that 
occasionally pick waste amongst other activities that include begging. The data 
reveals that the full time waste picking community is composed of 8,479 
individuals, forming part of 3,692 households representing a total population 
of 18,506 individuals depending upon these activities for survival (ibid). In 
terms of the street population partially partaking in waste picking activities, a 
population of 5,276 is identified, reflecting that beyond the core of the study 
which focuses on waste picking as a full time income generation source, it 
must be accounted that over five thousand individuals partake on an ad-hoc 
basis to the functioning of the recycling chain.  
Returning to our core population of full-time waste pickers, segmentation 
on the basis of sexes yields a rather balanced proportion of 45.5% women and 
55.5% men. When divided into age groups, men are over represented between 
the ages of 0-17 years, while women are more present in other cohorts, 
particularly between the ages of 18-40. Given the important dependent 
population that represents almost 10,000 individuals, a socio-demographic 
analysis of households is particularly important in understanding the wellbeing 
of its members. Out of the total amount of households, approximately 28% are 
headed by males and 72% headed by females. Particularly, out of the total 
amount of households, 34.4% are headed by single parents. What is particularly 
striking, however, is that in the case of female single-headed households the 
average amount of dependents is 4.5 people, relative to male single-headed 
households that sustain 2.5 people on average, demonstrating that a greater 
stress is placed on most waste picking women to sustain their dependents. 
This partially explains why child labour in this domain is so prominent. It 
is estimated that out of the 8,479 overall full-time waste pickers, 2800 are 
children between the ages of 5 and 17 years, representing 33% of the overall 
workforce. These children are considered to work on a full time basis and 
therefore do not for the large part partake in the formal educational system. 
The value of incorporating children and youth in the schooling system is 
initially based on the ability to expand literacy, cognitive and analytical skills yet 
it also withholds intrinsic benefits such as integrating children into an 
environment that broadens opportunities to find alternative social networks 
and employment opportunities in the long term. As these children become 
adults, it is therefore unsurprising that illiteracy rates are seven percentage 
points higher than the national average. In Colombia 10% of the population is 
considered to be illiterate, and in the case of waste pickers in Bogotá, the level 
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reaches 17.3%. On average more women than men are illiterate, representing 
57% and 42%, respectively. Observing the levels of education is also revealing 
of the low level of access and attendance in the formal educational system as 
only 25.2% have advanced beyond primary school.  
Given that the materials and working environment of waste pickers may 
cause serious health problems, access to health services is crucial to the ability 
to sustain activities over the long term. The study identifies that almost 65% 
have access to the health system, with respect to 35% who either do not, or do 
not know of their status relative to health services. What is particularly 
important to note, however, is that while the claim to health services is 
sustained, it refers to emergency health services rather than integral health care 
linked to social security. Usually the organizational status of waste pickers, 
either forming part of cooperative groups or operating individually, largely 
defines the relationships of waste pickers with social security coverage. In fact, 
the organizational status of waste pickers directly affects their linkages, not 
only to social security, but to other actors in the waste value chain. Let us now 
further delve into the existing distinctions within the waste picking community.  
3.2 Organizations and collective action 
While regrouping waste pickers as a homogenous body would facilitate the 
analysis, this would be unreflective of their respective relationship to the waste 
chain. Currently over 8,000 individuals actively pick through waste on a full 
time basis and over 5,000 do so part time. Within the full time waste picker 
community, a second subdivision is particularly relevant in analysing linkages 
given that certain individuals operate on an individual basis, and others form 
part of organized groups. The main logic behind organizing is to overcome the 
individualization of labour, which reinforces the fragmented nature of the 
labour market, and isolates individuals in their activities, limiting their capacity 
to process materials, and ultimately rendering them vulnerable to fluctuations 
and instability. Organizing individuals also means organizing their activities and 
their demands through negotiations, which help reduce overlapping activities, 
their transaction cost and potentially rebalance power structures. Estimates of 
organized waste pickers in Bogotá are quite unreliable. The National Statistics 
Department places the overall percentage of organized waster pickers at 11%, 
while the director of the Recycler’s Association of Bogotá places figures closer 
to 30% (Lievano Latorre et al. 2004, Padilla Herrera 2009). 
Individuals may operate individually by obligation because of deficient 
skills and habits which include working slowly, being drug or alcohol 
dependent, or sustaining discordant behaviour (Abarca 2009). They may also 
operate individually by choice valuing the flexibility sustained by autonomous 
employment, including the most appropriate hours of work, pick up spots and 
resale point which immediately affects the income level of these waste pickers. 
Cooperatives are undeniably central actors in altering both representation and 
demands at the local level, and let us turn to the Colombian context in which 
the rise of cooperatives may be situated.  
The organization of informal or unrecognized workers has been primarily 
through the mediums of the “social economy”. The rise of associative 
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movements in Colombia may be understood as a response to the shortfalls in 
the implementation of the centralized economic principals of the time, which 
saw in the 1930’s the first waves of market liberalization through foreign direct 
investment. The economic production and exchange models were of a 
fragmentary nature excluding groups with limited asset base from participating 
in the evolving economic model. Moulaert and Ailenei explain that “when the 
economic growth engine starts to stutter, formal distribution mechanisms 
begin to fail and new social forces develop and give rise to alternative 
institutions and mechanisms of solidarity and redistribution as a means of 
addressing the failures of the institutions of the socioeconomic movements to 
guarantee solidarity among economic agents” (Moulaert and Ailenei 2005: 
2038). 
 Between the 30’s and the 50’s, discussions in the public sphere iterated 
the importance of bridging and streamlining economic and social development 
at the national policy level so as to address substantial discrepancies between 
the rich and poor. In order to do so, Law 19 of 1958 was passed in order to 
edify the first National Plan for Economic and Social Development which 
served as a necessary platform for the progressive institutionalization of the 
social economy (Dane 2004: 7). The “social economy” began to take form as 
the values and practices of cooperativism emerged as an alternative economic 
production base. In 1963 the first regulatory board known as the 
Superintendencia de Cooperativas took charge of the registration, evaluation, 
inspection and control of cooperatives, not only recognizing them as legal 
entities, but further promoting them as a vehicle for production and 
distribution of essential goods and services (ibid). The early 80’s saw the 
conversion of this entity into the National Department of Cooperatives  
(DANCOOP) whose principal objectives were to “direct and execute the 
cooperative policies of the State” while “serving the popular interests and 
reaching higher levels of development” with a special focus on reducing the 
unsatisfied basic needs of the population (Dane 2004: 7). From there on, the 
cooperative model was adopted by alternative groups as a way to organize and 
be recognized as legal entities with rights and obligations relative to the State. 
Cooperatives have indeed been a decisive outcome of the development of 
associative bonds amongst waste pickers in Colombia.  
The aggregation of waste pickers into a consolidated group initially help 
divide activities and mainstream processes so as to benefit from economies of 
scale which, with appropriate leadership can be translated into a greater ability 
to negotiate with government or industries that form a type of monopsony 
coalition and set prices for the recuperated materials. Associative bonds may 
further help establish group agency with regards to the social and political 
dimensions of their work. It was not until the 1980’s that waste picker 
communities with the support of DANCOOP, and later the Fundación Social 
and the National Learning Service (SENA), began to propagate the 
cooperative form, and build upon technical education and private financial 
assistance to formalize the organizational base of these cooperatives. This 
formalization can be understood as a first step towards the institutionalization 
both of new methods of organization for informal waste workers and of new 
channels of dialogue between these workers and government entities. 
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3.3 A budding relationship in service delivery 
In order for the nature of the relationship between waste picker cooperatives 
and government to evolve, a shift in the structure, vision and response of 
Bogotá’s public administration occurred. Initially administrative, fiscal and 
political decentralization relegated more decision making power at the lower 
realms of government, shifting functions from central to local governments. 
This also meant that mayors were no longer appointed but rather elected, 
allowing urban residents to weigh into the establishment of new priorities at 
the city level by selecting their candidate.  
While Bogotá shied away from privatizing water, telephone and only partly 
privatizing electricity, waste services on the other hand were one of the first to 
be privatized after the massive failure of the state enterprise. In an attempt to 
adopt commercial principals in the waste sector, the municipal government of 
Bogotá outsourced 60% of the waste management load to private operators 
while withholding the obligation to cover 40% of local waste services 
(Rodriguez Garavito 2004: 25). Yet inadequacies in service coverage on behalf 
of the state enterprise brought forward a sanitary emergency in Bogotá which 
instigated a proposition on behalf of the Fundación Social to subcontract 
waste picker cooperatives both temporarily and in the long term to fulfil these 
needs. Despite successfully resolving the issue by picking 700 tons of solid 
waste per day during the emergency period, the government remained 
distrustful of directly subcontracting these waste picker organizations, 
preferring to use the Fundación Social as intermediary for these contracts 
(Wiego 2008: 14). Due to limitations relative to its legal entity, the Fundación 
was obliged to refuse such a relationship, which temporarily diffused possible 
agreements between the recycling cooperatives and the government (Rodriguez 
Garavito 2004: 26). 
Of important note, however, is that this was the first instance that 
Bogotá’s municipal government put in practice the framework of governance 
in waste management. By governance, we are looking at the collection of 
networks and structures, both formal and informal that institute new types of 
interactions between three principal actors at the local level, including 
government, private sector and civil society. It provides a new configuration 
for the market, so as to include the skills and contributions of multiple actors 
to provide more effective and efficient services to local communities. Despite 
the initial failure of privatizing services to social organizations, dialogue 
emerged between waste picker organizations and local government for a 
revision in their relationship. 
The 90’s were a decisive period for these social organizations. On one 
hand, waste picker cooperatives were multiplying at a rapid rate, forming 
regional and national networks so as to exchange knowledge, practices and 
strengthen their position within their communities, all the while coordinating 
for larger demands and proposals. These associative networks were becoming 
hard to overlook, and given the edification of two important legal decrees, a 
shift in the relationship between waste picker cooperatives and the government 
ensued. 
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Initially, Article 147 of Law 79 of 1998 stated that “cooperative 
organizations have obligatory preference and special treatment in the tendering 
of state contracts, while the legal requisites are fulfilled and these entities are 
found in equal or better conditions than other proponents,” meaning that 
cooperative organizations were from then on formally and institutionally linked 
to the issuance of government contracts (Alcaldía Mayor De Bogota 1988). In 
1994, however, Law 142 iterated that bidding for urban contracts was limited  
to ‘anonymous societies’, in this case openly directing the bid to private capital 
societies, whereby removing the right of cooperatives to compete for the 
contracts in large cities where a large proportion of waste is generated and 
managed (Canal RCN 2009: Abogada Adriana Ruiz). This subsequently 
instigated a repudiatory action on behalf of the ARB who placed a motion 
against this law, subsequently making its way to the Constitutional Court. This 
process stimulated an interesting debate which ended with the establishment of 
Sentence T724 in 2003 which gave way to the inclusion of affirmative action in 
favour of waste-picker organizations in these contracts (Alcaldía Mayor De 
Bogota 2003). 
Currently, 49 cooperative organizations of which 26 fall below the 
umbrella of the ARB are present in Bogotá’s waste picking scene, representing 
a membership or affiliation of 1,832 to 2,300 individuals depending on the 
source (Lievano Latorre et al. 2004: 47, Padilla Herrera 2009, Wiego 2008: 32). 
The coops regrouped below the ARB’s leadership, have been an important 
actor in voicing concerns and influencing the recognition and position of waste 
pickers within Bogotá’s solid waste management. Given the new paradigm 
relative to local service delivery, the shortfalls in coverage and quality of 
service, and the growing representation of this vulnerable group, a 
reconsideration of the overall system of solid waste management in Bogotá 
brought forward a new set of policies, streamlined and assembled through the 
PMIRS. The following chapter will serve as a brief outline of its principal 
characteristics and goals relative to the management of waste and the inclusion 
of the waste picker population, drawing on its implementation process for 
further analysis of its success. 
4 The Master Plan’s Framework and execution 
The PMIRS was born out of the social prioritization of waste issues in the 
capital city of Bogotá. In the early 90’s waste services in the city were 
performed mostly on an ad-hoc basis until Mayor Jaime Castro signed into 
decree in 1994 the existence of an executive agency, the Unidad Ejecutiva de 
Servicios Publicos (UESP), as a dependent body of the central administration’s 
office responsible for the design and implementation of public service policies. 
About a decade later, the UESP became known as the Unidad Administrativa 
Especial de Servicios Publicos (UAESP) as it gained greater autonomy from 
central planning, and took on the coordination, supervision and control of 
recollection services, transport, final disposition, recycling and productive 
utilization of waste materials, in addition to street cleaning and lighting 
(Pedraza Poveda 2008: 5). Falling within its functions, the UAESP formulated 
the PMIRS which was sanctioned in 2006, two years after the principal 
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objectives for the intervention and formulation of a general system of solid 
waste had been proposed. 
The plan puts forward four structural objectives which are resumed 
according to three axes for policy and action: 
1. To incorporate citizens of the Capital District and of regional 
municipalities in a culture of ‘at source’ separation, minimization and 
productive utilization of solid waste, with an understanding of the 
positive impacts that these practices exert on the environment, on 
public health and the use of public spaces. 
2. To maximize economies of scale, with high efficiency, competitiveness 
and productivity indicators, and the lowest social and environmental 
impact in the delivery of these public services so as to reduce cost for 
the beneficiaries.  
3. To articulate regional infrastructural development for the establishment 
of final disposal and treatment sites, in addition to the macro routes 
used for the transportation of solid waste which would best make use 
of the competitive and comparative advantage of the different 
municipalities and of the capacity of their public, private and 
community agents.  
4. To always articulate principals of efficiency and financial sufficiency in 
the management of solid waste in such a way to promote affirmative 
actions for service beneficiaries with limited financial means, and for 
the waste picking community in condition of poverty and vulnerability 
so as to socially include and recognize their work and role as actors in 
the general solid waste system. (Decreto 312 2006) 
Initially, separation at source encourages households, offices and businesses to 
separate materials into categories that make their transportation, processing, 
resale or disposal more efficient and effective. At source separation is the 
primary activity performed by waste pickers, whereby alteration in current 
practices are likely to immediately affect their everyday activities. Secondly, the 
selective recollection route is meant to be managed by the UAESP and carried 
out by formal operators, meaning that transportation is no longer a function of 
waste pickers’ work or of informal organizations that are not registered as 
transportation entities. Further, new regulation regarding the limited use of 
carts and animal-driven transportation in the city have meant that traditional 
methods have been prohibited in such a way as the entire system rely on 
formal mechanisms and transportation routes, even if this has hardly translated 
into practice. 
While the first two dimensions reduce the relevance of waste pickers’ 
activities in the waste chain, the last two dimensions were meant to reorient 
and expand their utility within the overall master plan. Four recycling parks 
were planned to be opened to further separate materials for processing. Upon 
construction, the management of these parks would be open for various 
private and collective enterprises to place bids. In practical terms, this 
opportunity is only extended to cooperative entities that are sufficiently 
established, and withhold external knowledge and relationships allowing for 
formal bids to be placed and to compete against private enterprises.  
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Due to these limitations, there is recognition within the PMIRS that 
additional inclusionary mechanisms are essential in lifting the overall condition 
of waste pickers in conditions of vulnerability and poverty, and as such the 
policies for ‘social inclusion’ can be divided into three categories: 
1. Linkages to the productive process, commercial process and service 
delivery through the expanded formation of technical competencies 
that improve earnings, the solidification of micro-entrepreneurial 
capacity and the opening of doors to alternative labour opportunities. 
2. Strategies for greater work recognition and reduction of vulnerability, 
including such elements as the improvement of dialogue for the 
exchange of knowledge, the reduction of illiteracy both of adult and 
child groups, and the elimination of child labour due to greater 
integration in the public school system. 
3. Strategies aimed at strengthening both the formation of new waste 
picker organizations and the consolidation of existing cooperatives 
through technical and legal counselling, supplemented by assistance to 
access resources from cooperative agencies at the national and 
international level. (Decreto 312 2006) 
Planned in 2004, the PMIRS reflected three implementation cycles with the 
first and most immediate initiatives being implemented between 2006 and 
2008. Many organizations including the Contraloría de Bogotá, local and 
national media, and waste picker organizations have been consulted to provide 
a review and cross-examination of the proposed objectives with the current 
situation of solid waste management in Bogotá. We will first briefly comment 
on the immediate outputs emanating from the plan’s implementation, giving 
way to the respective successes and shortfalls of the program. A review of the 
initial waste chart resulting from the PMIRS may be observed in Figure 4.1. 
The separation of materials by offices, households, restaurants and 
businesses before disposal and recollection has changed the nature of the 
relationship between waste pickers and the post consumption flow. When this 
waste is placed in public disposal sites composed of small and large bins on the 
street, waste pickers are highly encouraged to pass before the trucks to take 
away materials with the highest economic value, as this reduces the amount of 
time they dedicate to extract materials (L. Gomez 2008: 1). In some cases, 
those who dispose of this waste are aware that these materials hold a resale 
value, and therefore attempt to earn a portion of this value by separating yet 
withholding the materials until waste pickers purchase them directly. This 
encourages what is called itinerant waste buying, which effectively has three 
repercussions. First, a middleman is created in the chain, which extracts a flat 
fee from the waste pickers who will obtain lower gross revenue from the same 
quantity of materials. Secondly, this implies that fewer materials will enter the 
recollection route and hence fewer materials arrive for processing at the formal 
recycling plants, reducing the quantity of formal jobs created in these centres. 
Thirdly it encourages the co-existence of formal and informal waste 
management systems (Veeduria Distrital 2008: 1). These three repercussions 
are further exacerbated by the implementation of the Comparendo Ambiental 
regulation in 2009, which has rendered the opening of bags on the street illegal 
and punishable by hefty fines (Canal RCN 2009). This has been a determining 
21 
factor in the rise of itinerant waste buying relative to other methods of waste 
picking in the urban landscape.  
FIGURE 4.1 
 The Waste Value Chain Revisited (post PMIRS) 
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The UAESP has been in charge of drawing effective routes for the 
collection of pre-divided materials, which in 2008 covered 74,300 service 
beneficiaries (Gomez, 2008, Pedraza Poveda 2008: 6). While this route is 
expected to expand in the following years for greater geographical coverage, it 
is in fact quite limited when considering the current population that is in excess 
of 6.5 million inhabitants and all the industries operating in the capital city. 
Effectively this recollection route is only covering 3.5% of the total population 
linked to the formal solid waste management system (Alcaldía Mayor De 
Bogota 2009). 
Given the limited reach of the current recollection routes, what can be 
observed is further segmentation between the formal and informal waste 
management systems. Naturally areas that lack collection coverage continue to 
provide strong incentives for waste pickers to operate and resell their materials 
to the 800 informal junk/recycling shops that exist in the city (Padilla Herrera 
2009). This tendency reflects immediate shortfalls relative to the plan’s 
aspirations, both in terms of the widespread collection of materials, and the 
new formal employment opportunities created through the edification of 
formal recycling plants. Indeed, to absorb both potentially recyclable materials 
and a projected 800 waste pickers for the operation and administration of these 
centres, the construction of four recycling plants had been planned. The first 
proposed recycling centre, El Salitre, never came into existence. Strong 
pressures on behalf of citizen groups living in the construction area halted 
progress due to demonstrations (Alarcon Moreno 2008, Contraloria de Bogota 
2007). The second centre El Tintal succumbed to similar pressures, giving way 
to the existence only of a third and much smaller centre for this purpose called 
La Alquería. The bid for the administration and operation of the centre was 
won by the Union Temporal de Recicladores, an umbrella organization 
representing three waste picker associations (Veira Rojas 2008).  
La Alquería initially employed 42 individuals, 4 of which fulfilled 
administrative roles, and 38 who were dedicated to operations which included 
the reception of material, their classification and commercialization. At the 
household level, the government states that these 42 employees benefitted a 
dependent population of 176 individuals (Alcaldía Mayor De Bogota 2008). 
With the increase in daily reception of potentially recyclable material from 4 
tons/day in 2006 to approximately 9 tons/day in August 2008 and 14 tons/day 
in February 2009, the flow of daily processed materials has stimulated the 
formation of new formal employment positions at La Alquería (L. Gomez 
2009). Currently more than 50 individuals work there, benefitting a group in 
excess of 200 individuals. The immediate benefits secured by these workers 
include the formal recognition of their work, a fixed monthly income at the 
rate of the minimum wage, coverage from the social security plan, a reduction 
in work accidents due to better sanitary conditions and a reduction in the 
competition for the materials which also reduces the potentiality of 
conflict/violence amongst waste pickers (Alcaldía Mayor De Bogota 2008). We 
must keep in mind, however, that 50 formal jobs of the projected 800 
significantly limits the transition of 8,479 individuals into the ISWM system.  
Taking into account the narrowness of reach of the first three dimensions of 
the recycling plan, this final element was designed as a way of linking the 
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overall waste picking population to education and training initiatives meant to 
reinforce organizational skills, personal skills, alternative methods of income 
generation, and educative opportunities to reduce child labour. Specifically, out 
of the 18,506 individuals linked to the process of waste picking, 5,840 were 
initially targeted by UAESP. Of these 5,840 individuals, only 440 were 
effectively linked to any of these dimensions (Contraloría De Bogota 2007). 
The process of becoming an official cooperative in Colombia requires 
these organizations to proceed through two years formation with external 
actors, as a way of strengthening administrative processes, human resources 
and accounting. In the 1990’s, the Fundación Social was the main external 
actor involved in the process of upgrading organizational skills. At the turn of 
the century, most cooperatives were founded and operational giving priority to 
practical material separation courses and technological upgrading implemented 
by the District University and the SENA. Prior to the PMIRS, it is said that out 
of the 49 active cooperatives, 73% were receiving support by national or 
international organizations in the fields of technical upgrading and training 
(Lievano Latorre et al. 2004). In other words, the PMIRS workshops proved to 
be largely redundant and glaringly unsuccessful in the face of a low rate of 
participation accounting for 120 individuals of a project group of 2800. 
Further, only one workshop was offered to strengthen organizations and no 
workshops were being offered in technological upgrading which has been 
stated as one of the building blocks to increase the ability of individuals and 
organizations to capture new processes to step up in the value chain (Padilla 
Herrera 2009). 
Child labour was approached as a central issue relative to waste picker’s 
situation of vulnerability. A strong link is established between children’s work 
and low levels of literacy, which, beyond the intrinsic benefits of reading and 
writing represent the development of cognitive and analytical skills transferable 
in different spheres of life and work. This is especially relevant given that 
approximately 33% of waste pickers in Bogotá are children (Alcaldía Mayor De 
Bogota 2009). The plan aimed at eradicating 80% of child labour, yet an 
oversight of key underpinnings have greatly reduced the success rate closer to 
10% (Contraloría De Bogota 2007). For starters, no policies at the cooperative 
level were designed against child labour given that the work of children is 
considered by the organizations to be the symptom of a problem rather than a 
problem in itself. Nohra Padilla from the ARB states that if the incomes of 
waste pickers became more stable due to a reduction of price fluctuation per 
ton, then most households would be confident in the consistency of their 
earnings, thus reducing the importance and contribution of their child’s 
activities in relation to household earnings (Padilla Herrera 2009). This helps 
readjust the cost-benefit analysis favouring long term investment in education 
relative to immediate productive yields. The transition of 290 out of 2240 
children identified through the census indicates that despite the positive shift 
for a group of children, almost 2000 remain outside the education system and 
limits future opportunities for these youth. As a critical observer and evaluator 
of the UAESP’s work, the Controller’s Office has summarized the preliminary 
outcomes of the plan stating that “the district administration must promote the 
conditions so that equality may be true and effective, in this case the 
administration did not adopt the sufficient means in favour of discriminated or 
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marginal groups so as to allow greater material equality” (Contraloría De 
Bogota 2007: 8). Before concluding so boldly, let us now turn to qualitative 
remarks regarding the impacts of the PMIRS on the waste picking community. 
5 Successes, shortfalls and evolving institutions 
A thorough analysis of the program outputs would not be possible without 
first recalling the multiple intentions that preceded the construction and 
implementation of the PMIRS. What is particularly complex when approaching 
the foundation of new forms of collaboration are in fact the divergent interests 
that are at the base of any partnership. As a formal decree, the PMIRS 
withholds the hopes and aspirations of a select group of government officials 
and specialists whose primary interest is to mainstream the processes of waste 
management in such a way that coverage and cost are indirectly correlated. In 
assessing their options and juggling their possibilities, the recognition of waste 
pickers’ work and the importance of their contribution have been valued, 
despite a general disregard to the different segments that constitute this 
population, and their respective limitations relative to their linkage to formal 
processes. Additionally the plan overlooks the variety of activities that occupy 
waste-pickers’ time, whereby replacing the largely labour-intensive methods of 
operation for capital-intensive ways of organizing, collecting and processing 
the materials, creating redundant activities rather than efficient and integrated 
systems. 
Waste pickers, mostly through the medium of their organizations and the 
ARB, claim that the inclusionary dimensions of the PMIRS are largely a 
reaction to their own activism and presence in the public sphere which, over 
the last twenty years, has constructed a platform for dialogue. The existence of 
the ARB is a feat in itself, as it represents the evolving nature of the 
institutional landscape which devolves the opportunity to voice proposals to 
those with the ability to organize behind a collective purpose. Within this 
evolving context, and accounting for the successes of representation, Nohra 
Padilla claims that the main goal of the Association today is to obtain a 
guarantee on behalf of the government for a fixed price per ton of select 
material. The perspective is built mostly on a market approach that places 
merit on the reduction of middlemen in the value chain and the stability of 
prices to reduce fluctuations in income. Aside from this goal, other issues 
including child labour are seen as a symptom of the problem rather than a 
problem in itself. In other words the success or failure of the PMIRS is 
determined primarily on the ability to create income stability and value-added 
production to curb deteriorating and fluctuating income trends. 
The relevance of observing these major discrepancies is that the success of 
the PMIRS is highly contested amongst the media, the mayor’s office, the 
controller’s office and the waste picker themselves. Given the divergent 
interests and expectations it is hard to paint in thick brushstrokes the colours 
of success or failure. Rather, what is put forward is the multidimensionality of 
interests which are trying to be reconciled through new modalities in service 
delivery at the local level. As stated by Padilla, the results can be categorized as 
normal given the learning curve, representing both victories and failures for all 
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those involved (Padilla Herrera 2009). In terms of transitioning into a system 
of ISWM, cleavages suggest that two operational waste circuits continue to 
exist side by side, fuelling the fragmented coherence suggested by Beal and Fox 
(2009). At the same time, all is not lost as we now observe elements 
corresponding to the employment approach taken up by government and the 
value-chain approach taken on by waste picking organizations. 
The spectrum of integration into the master plan reflects the distinct 
linkages that have been created or encouraged during the first two years of 
TABLE 5.1 
 Synthesized Outcomes according to Waste Picker Segment 
 Cooperatives – Employees 
of La Alquería 
Cooperatives –  
Other members 
Individual Waste Pickers 
Work 
Recognition 
Formal position as workers 
within ISWM 
Growing recognition of 
complementary contribution to 
ISWM 
Growing recognition of their 
activities as work 
Stable 
Remuneration 
Fixed rate per hour at level of 
minimum wage 
Earnings fluctuate. Based on 
market price of 
materials/weight negotiated by 
cooperative 
Earnings fluctuate. Based on 
market price of materials/weight 
defined by junk shops 
Linkage to social 
security 
Yes Applicable only to members of 
the most 
developed/established 
cooperatives 
For a large majority, no 
Working 
conditions 
Sanitary garments provided; 
facilities and conditions of work 
regulated and improved 
Established geographical 
coverage improves 
relationship with local 
community, but no major 
changes in occupational 
safety & hygiene 
No major changes in 
occupational safety & hygiene 
Collective stance Positive discrimination in 
contract bids; 
Contract negotiation 
Dialogue with external actors 
Positive discrimination for 
cooperatives in contract bids 
Dialogue with external actors 
None 
Linkage to 
external actors 
Government bodies 
Universities 
Foundations & civil society 
groups 
Private sector (Tetrapack) 
Lawyers/ Legal System 
Mostly through the ARB: 
Government bodies 
Universities 
Foundations & civil society 
groups 
Private sector (Tetrapack) 
Lawyers/ Legal System 
May link at will with 
cooperatives. Further linkages 
and representation available 
through cooperative platform 
Access to 
training 
Materials separation courses Organizational strengthening 
workshops 
Limited attendance: 
-Alternative income generation 
schemes 
- Cooperative formation 
Access to capital 
investment 
They operate in top level 
facility but do not own either 
the plant or machinery 
Limited to the availability of 
surplus to be reinvested in the 
cooperative 
Limited to informal 
lending/borrowing 
Shift in the 
value-chain 
Noteworthy as a best practice 
between government and 
waste pickers, reduction of 
middleman (junk shop) 
None Fragmented operations; 
marginalized activities as police 
may intercept at will due to the  
Comparendo Ambiental 
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implementation. In order to review these findings, Table 5.1 resumes the 
outputs according to the critical subdivisions of beneficiaries. The PMIRS 
clearly had divergent impacts depending on the organizational status of waste 
pickers, notably a large divide can be perceived between members of 
cooperatives, most specifically workers at La Alquería, relative to their 
fragmented counterparts. As a way of regrouping these findings for purposeful 
analysis, we now return to the main objectives which guide the organizations 
of the social economy and justify its presence as a market actor; that of 
restoring social justice in production relations. Let us recall the two primary 
dimensions this concept puts forward according to Fraser (1999 ); that of 
instigating recognition through the vehicle of empowerment, and that of 
fostering effective redistribution as a means of securing greater access to 
resources for a change in socio-economic patterns.  
Recognition for waste picker’s work first emerged due to a gleaming 
victory at the level of the Constitutional Court, instigating and canalizing 
dialogue between the state and waste picker organizations. These organizations 
have been the founding motivators for the unfolding inclusionary dimensions 
in the PMIRS. Recognition emerges as a reinforced outcome based on the 
plan’s implementation which affirms the centrality of waste picking’s 
environmental, social and economic benefits, reiterating the functional 
importance of waste pickers in the urban landscape. In some way, this 
recognition produces a positive externality for all waste pickers alike, regardless 
whether they are affiliated to cooperatives or operating individually. In a 
special television report, a female waste picker claimed that she now knows the 
central role and important value her work withholds in terms of the benefits 
this service produces in the societal sphere and for the environment (Canal 
RCN 2009). This affirmation goes to demonstrate that her position, as that of 
many other waste pickers has shifted sufficiently in the public sphere that she 
has cognitively assimilated a new role as a social actor, overthrowing past 
trends of violence against waste pickers in Bogotá. 
Work recognition serves to legitimize the activity and utility of waste 
pickers, whereby extending greater assertion and influence to these groups. 
With appropriate leadership, they have managed to canalize intentions and 
articulate concerns, guide demands, and further mobilize and influence 
decision making (ibid). As part of a process of empowerment, cooperative 
bodies ensure not only representation of interests, but seek to establish new 
basis of partnerships which further strengthen their position in the solid waste 
management systems (Giraldo 2009). Beyond recognition from society and 
government, other actors including universities and foundations continue to 
invest time and money in the development of skills that allow cooperatives to 
form attractive contract bids, improve personal and organizational skills, and 
further negotiate with third parties beyond the realm of government- third 
sector partnerships. They are continuously embedding themselves in the 
economic and social aspects of their work and its effect on society.  
However, great successes at the levels of recognition and empowerment 
may be attributed to the cooperatives and the ARB, including the First World 
Conference and Third Latin American Conference of Waste Pickers, bringing 
together cooperatives from different regions of the continent and of the world 
27 
to exchange best practices and methods to urge the recognition and pleas for 
active participation in local urban waste management. Further, March 1st was 
established as the National Day of the Waste Picker in Colombia, valorising 
both the waste pickers and the activities they perform (Wiego 2008). It has 
further been announced over the summer of 2009 that an agreement between 
the BID, Tetrapack and the ARB evaluated at $1.8 million has been placed 
forward to create an economic cluster for the development of recycling 
(Giraldo 2009). As suggested by Berner, “to actively challenge the dominance 
system beyond local, reactive and spontaneous resistance, subordinate groups 
need alliances with factions of the upper class, in other words, existing or 
potentially strategic groups” (Berner 2001: 124). Despite the prematurity of 
commenting on possible outcomes, it is important to highlight that by aligning 
energies with large established bodies, the ARB is taking a stance beyond 
dialogue with local government to legitimize their efforts and labour and 
further develop relationships with new strategic groups. 
As this partnership between the BID, Tetrapack and the ARB underlines, 
one of the greatest drawbacks from the PMIRS has been the lack of intentional 
investment in cooperative organizations which would strengthen and upgrade 
technical and technological capacity. By overlooking the fact that cooperatives 
perform a service yet earn their living according to a market logic, the 
government-proposed PMIRS misses the mark in identifying the ways in which 
these organizations may strengthen their stance within this market. Arguably if 
the UAESP is not willing or able to pay wages to waste pickers, then it must 
also recognize that investment in capital and training are necessary for 
organizations to competitively operate in service provision. This would allow 
for workers to further develop their skills and access assets that help upgrade 
processes to include such things as melting glass or plastic for reprocessing. In 
light of past developments and of the PMIRS, the issues of redistribution 
through improved access to resources at the level of the organization and of 
the individual are simply not addressed. As argued by Filion (1998: 1112), one 
of the leading difficulties faced by small scale economic development initiatives 
“concern the limiting impact of the organizational and structural characteristics 
of CED (community economic development) ventures on their capacity to 
compete successfully with mainstream firms”. He further argues that there isn’t 
sufficient flexibility and economies of scale to hold a competitive position in 
the industry (ibid). Flexibility and economies of scale are rooted both in 
organizational capacity and the capital investments cooperatives are able to 
make. With the exception of the 50 workers in La Alquería who operate 
government-owned machinery, waste pickers still operate with human or 
animal driven carts, resell their materials to a middleman and have limited 
opportunities to transform these materials beyond personal reuse of well-
preserved residues. Competitiveness insinuates a largely different picture. 
Initially, limited access to capital has meant that waste pickers continue to 
rely on labour intensive methods, which on a cost-benefit-efficiency scale lose 
out compared to capital intensive methods. Waste pickers in countries such as 
Brazil and Argentina have lobbied strongly to obtain financing to upgrade their 
technologies, something that has altogether been a flaw of the Colombian, and 
specifically the Bogotá experience (Arroyo Moreno et al. 1999). Without access 
to capital, the trucks necessary to transport materials, the yards necessary to 
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temporarily store materials, and the machinery necessary to transform the 
materials into industrial inputs limits the ability to capture additional segments 
of the waste value-chain. The continued presence of junkshop and industrial 
transformers mean that these middlemen continue to retain a portion of the 
value-added dimensions of reprocessing waste, thereby forgoing the 
opportunity of cooperatives to upgrade in the value chain. 
In practice, the lack of immediate investment by the state and the limited 
access to capital, has meant that both the ability to capture a greater proportion 
of the value of materials, and the overall fluctuation of prices derived from the 
sale of the materials is left unaddressed, creating a vicious circle of marginal 
and fluctuating incomes which encourage limited reinvestment (Arango 2006: 
24). Effectively, the lack of competitiveness relative to the private sector, 
compounded by limited opportunities for growth and capture in the value 
chain reaffirm the inability of waste pickers to observe a significant change in 
their socio-economic access. In fact, one of Padilla’s greatest challenge as the 
director of the ARB is to continue to place pressure on the government so that 
they implement a guaranteed price of material per ton as a way of encouraging 
stability in waste pickers’ revenues, because, as she states, even though 
cooperatives can negotiate a better price with industry as compared to 
individual waste pickers, there is still a concrete need to provide income 
security and stability (Padilla Herrera 2009). 
Although the waste-pickers’ cooperatives have made progress in the battle 
for recognition of their members, it is estimated that between eleven and thirty 
percent of waste pickers are part of these cooperatives, whereby leaving the 
greatest portion of workers outside the realm of their benefits. Whether due to 
personal or organizational impediments, these bodies effectively represent the 
interest of a small portion of the larger community, which would lead me to 
highlight that the social economy holds contiguous mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion, distributing benefits primarily to those who are included rather 
than to the whole population it is assumed to represent. In other words the 
cooperatives represent a building block out of fragmented waste picking 
activities which yield certain benefits, yet these benefits remain limited partially 
in their scope, and mostly in their reach. 
Cooperatives hold incentives that bring them to operate on the fringe of 
private sector and civil society logic, meaning that there is a need to assess the 
course and nature of activities to evaluate their impact on growth and the 
strengthening of these enterprises so as to become competitive relative to 
other private actors that increasingly dominate waste management. In order to 
avoid obsolescence over the long term, a market analysis would lead us to view 
the importance of upgrading the skills and equipment of cooperatives in order 
to compete against the private firms who hold the technical and technological 
knowledge to continue capturing segments of the value chain. As cooperative 
entities, the ability to reinvest is dictated by the ability to set aside a portion of 
total revenues to this end. Yet in the case of the low and fluctuating prices of 
materials, the priority of cooperative members is to ensure their wellbeing 
before further reinvesting. 
In the perspective of forming new modalities for service delivery through 
partnerships, the complementarities of activities is central to reallocating 
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individuals and their processes according to a critical analysis that 
acknowledges the heterogeneity of the population, the nature of activities and 
the divergent interests hoping to be achieved simultaneously by distinct 
stakeholders. Ultimately yes, the institutional landscape has shifted positively in 
favour of the representation and linkage of cooperative groups with external 
actors. Yet relying on the benevolence or voluntarism of these actors can 
create a relationship of dependency, and certainly does not guarantee to 
overcome an important shortfall embedded in the social economy which 
effectively distribute social recognition in spite of redistributing activities that 
generate unstable or insufficient revenues for patterns of consumption and 
investment to be altered at the individual or organizational levels. In other 
words, without the capability of addressing both recognition and redistribution, 
the social economy foments a vicious circle of economic marginality and 
basically reorganises poverty. 
6 Conclusions 
The importance of analyzing the issue of waste picking is that it represents the 
intersection of two increasingly pertinent topics of concern to our societies; 
poverty and waste. As waste picking continues to provide income generating 
activities for the poor in absence of formal employment opportunities, the 
important shift in waste picking from an atomized undertaking to an 
organizational base provides a platform where the poor can become social 
actors within a local governance framework. In a time where the discourse on 
public services has evolved beyond delivery by state or private actors, it now 
accounts for the inclusion of the third sector, in this case represented by 
cooperatives that form alternate networks of organization. These cooperatives 
hope to reinstate social justice in production relations which have arguably 
been stripped by neoliberal thought from any logic beyond efficient economic 
dimensions. They seek to tackle the dimensions of recognition to overcome 
injustices in patterns of representation, and of redistribution to overcome 
injustices in socio-economic patterns (Fraser 1999). The question, however, is 
whether these cooperative bodies serve as an effective platform to significantly 
affect these deficiencies and overcome the institutionalized nature of poverty. 
The new modalities of service delivery implemented in Bogotá serve as a 
case study as both waste picker associations and government entities engaged 
in this partnership. Understanding the heterogeneity of the individuals, 
activities and current organization of the recycling circuit led formal and 
informal agents to operate side by side with households capturing part of the 
monetary value of waste, limiting the overall residues sent to the recycling 
parks and finally foregoing many formal positions for waste pickers to 
reallocate within the chain. All these results are quite counterintuitive when 
considering the original drive to institute ISWM. While the plan has been 
largely unsuccessful at reorganizing and mainstreaming waste processes, 
recognition can be identified as the primary benefit brought forward by 
organized groups whose linkages with external actors and legal challenges of 
the regulatory regime transformed the institutional landscape which had 
originally been responsible for overlooking their activities. Waste pickers today 
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are front runners in contract bids, are socially and environmentally engaged 
agents, and are increasingly valued as multidimensional stakeholders. 
In the sense of redistribution, however, successes have fallen significantly short 
of projections, initially segmenting the waste picking population further 
between three beneficiary groups, with 50 out of a total of 8,479 accessing 
what may be considered formal employment conditions. A second group is 
composed of organized waste pickers falling outside the reach of jobs like 
those at La Alquería and left largely unaffected by the programme due to lack 
of investment in targeted skill formation, the capital goods required for 
competitiveness relative to private sector entities or to capture new segments 
of the value chain (such as operating transportation or reprocessing waste to 
create added value to the recovered materials). The third group, which 
represent at least two-thirds of the waste picking population, continue to 
operate individually and on a piecemeal basis, side-by-side with the formal 
system and without any linkages to organizations that may help move their 
position away from marginality.  
Filion clearly underlines the contradiction posed by these social economy 
organizations as he states they are currently “caught between, on the one hand, 
growing interest in this movement in a climate of economic difficulties and 
yearning for community economic empowerment and, on the other hand, a 
paucity of resources required for the success of its enterprises” (Filion 1998: 
1118). Without considering the economic incentives and payoffs of the wider 
market, social economy enterprises compete at a disadvantage against other 
private sector actors whose motivation is to fine tune and mainstream 
processes for maximal efficiency and reduced cost. Governments are hard 
pressed to find ways to expand service delivery while containing costs, and it is 
therefore important for organizations engaged in new modalities of service 
delivery to be competitive amongst the potential service providers so as to 
avoid obsolescence. The social economy is based in the tenet that economic 
action is embedded in social relations, yet it seeks to operate outside of an 
economic logic of competitiveness. 
All in all, the case of the partnership between waste-pickers, their 
cooperatives, and the local government in Bogota shows that unless the 
cooperatives are provided or facilitated with the technical skills and capital 
upgrades required to compete in a sector driven by a market logic, they are 
unable to capture value-added processes that facilitate redistribution. With 
recognition and redistribution at the core of social justice, if partnerships serve 
to promote one of these dimensions at the expense of the other, then 
partnerships are instrumentalized to advance the narrow interests of select 
actors rather than act a as a true parting point from institutionalized poverty. 
Progress in achieving both of these goals at the same time, therefore, requires a 
considerable investment by both government and social economy 
organisations that can hardly be aligned with cost-cutting pressures in public 
service delivery.  The promotion of participation of social enterprises is 
significantly costly in terms of time, resources and organisational skills that 
increase transaction costs, so it should not be assumed at face value that 
partnerships reduce costs.  
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